when making the hiring decision, but should not take When making judgments, one may encounter not the appearance of a candidate into consideration, even only justifiable factors, i.e., attributes which the judge though she may want to hire the better-looking candithinks that he/she should take into consideration, but date. In this article, we distinguish between two types also unjustifiable factors, i.e., attributes which the of factors: (a) factors that the judge in a given judgment judge wants to take into consideration but knows he/ task believes that he or she should take into considershe should not. It is proposed that the influence of an ation, and (b) factors that the judge wants to take into unjustifiable factor on one's judgment depends on the consideration but knows that he or she should not. The present research examines how unjustifiable facgested that the effect could be a result of a self-ori-tors influence judgments when there is elasticity in jusented justification process. Implications of this re-tifiable factors. ''Elasticity in justifiable factors'' refers search for decisions involving a should-vs-want con-to the possibility of interpreting those factors in multiflict are discussed. ᭧ 1996 Academic Press, Inc.
The present research examines how unjustifiable facgested that the effect could be a result of a self-ori-tors influence judgments when there is elasticity in jusented justification process. Implications of this re-tifiable factors. ''Elasticity in justifiable factors'' refers search for decisions involving a should-vs-want con-to the possibility of interpreting those factors in multiflict are discussed. ᭧ 1996 Academic Press, Inc.
ple ways. In this article, it refers more specifically to the condition where different justifiable factors have different values and the relative weights among those Imagine the following scenario: A judge is scoring factors are ambiguous so that one can interpret the two finalists in an international piano competition. One aggregate effect of those factors in multiple ways.
1 For player represents the country the judge is from and the most judgment tasks, there is elasticity in justifiable other player represents a different country. During the factors. For example, in the piano competition example, competition, one player played more difficult music but it is typically ambiguous how to weigh music difficulty the other made fewer errors. In this case, the judge against number of errors. Consequently, it will be elaswould most likely know that he should take music dif-tic in judging which player deserves the higher score. ficulty and number of errors into consideration when One approach to the question of how unjustifiable making his scoring decision, but should not take the factors influence judgments can be found in normative nationality of a player into consideration, even though decision theories. These theories do not distinguish athe may want to give his compatriot the higher score. tributes that are unjustifiable from those that are justiConsider another example: An engineer is interviewing fiable. They implicitly assume that an unjustifiable factwo job candidates for a computer programmer position tor behaves just like another attribute and that its inand finds that one candidate is better looking than the fluence on one's judgment, if any, is independent of other. The two candidates have different computer pro-justifiable factors, regardless of whether there is elasgramming skills, each good at one computer language. ticity in the justifiable factors or not. Here, the engineer would probably know that she Based on social psychological research, which will be should take computer-related skills into consideration reviewed below, I propose that the unjustifiable factor does not behave like a justifiable factor and is not indeThis research was funded in part by a fourth-quarter support from pendent of other attributes. It influences one's judgthe Graduate School of Business, University of Chicago. I thank the ment through elasticity in justifiable factors. The un-judgment if there is elasticity in the justifiable factors ing room were given a choice of sitting either with a handicapped or with a nonhandicapped confederate; than if there is not. The above proposition will be referred to as the elasticity hypothesis.
more subjects chose to sit with the nonhandicapped person if the two confederates were watching different The reasoning behind this hypothesis is as follows:
video programs than if they were watching the same When there is no elasticity in justifiable factors, the program. Those authors claimed that subjects were mojudge has no excuse for taking the unjustifiable factor tivated to avoid the handicapped person and that in into consideration. When there is elasticity, the judge the different-video condition they could avoid sitting can distort his or her evaluation of the elastic justifiable with the handicapped person and pretend that they factors in the direction of the unjustifiable factor and were choosing between video programs. then make a judgment that appears to be based solely on the justifiable factors but is in effect influenced by
The second study was about task choice (Hsee, 1995) . Subjects were recruited ostensibly to proofread materithe unjustifiable factor. The above process can be termed elastic justification. As will be discussed later, als. They were given a choice of two files to proofread:
One contained boring furniture ads but was described this process can occur even if there is no third party to check on one's judgment. In other words, the elastic as urgently needed and would allow subjects to make relatively more money if they chose to proofread it. The justification can be purely self-oriented, rather than toward others.
other contained more interesting personal ads but was described as less urgently needed and would not allow The elasticity hypothesis is based on several lines subjects to make as much money as the furniture ads of research in the existing literature. First, people do file. More subjects chose to proofread the personal ads not arbitrarily make decisions simply because they if the expected payments were expressed in ranges are tempted to do so; instead, they attempt to mainthan if they were expressed as fixed values. Hsee (1995) tain a sense of accountability and seek justifications assumed that subjects wanted to read the personal ads for their decisions (e.g., Bies and Shapiro, 1988; Reis, but found it unjustifiable to do so when that option was 1987; Tetlock & Boettger, 1989; Tetlock & Kim, clearly less urgent and less well-paying, and that the 1987). This implies that most people will not knowambiguity in payments gave subjects an excuse for ingly allow unjustifiable factors to influence their choosing the personal ads. judgments. Second, many studies have shown that implicit or suppressed motivations can influence peoAlthough the findings of these studies are consistent with the elasticity hypothesis, they are open to other ple's perception and judgment in a way that satisfies those motivations (e.g., Baumeister & Newman, interpretations. First, it is not clear whether the assumptions held by the authors were true. For example, 1994; Greenberg et al., 1993; Gilovich, 1983; Hastorf & Cantril, 1954 , Klein & Kunda, 1992 ; Kunda, it is not clear whether subjects in Hsee's (1995) study considered reading the personal ads unjustifiable. Sec-1990; Kunda, 1987; Lord, Ross & Lepper, 1979; Pyszczynski & Greenberg, 1987; Showers & Cantor, ond, it is not clear whether the elasticity/ambiguity effects in those studies occurred because the subjects 1985). These findings suggest that an unjustifiable factor can veer people's evaluation of justifiable fac-in the elastic/ambiguous condition engaged in a selfjustification process or because they thought they could tors in the direction of the unjustifiable factor. take advantage of the ambiguity and justify their However, neither of these lines of research is conchoice to others. Third, both of those studies were concerned with the focus of the present research-the role cerned with choice; it is not clear whether the finding of ambiguity or elasticity in judgments. There are a can be generalized to a judgment task. number of studies that have addressed this issue, directly or indirectly. These studies are scattered in disLet us consider a third study, conducted by Van Averparate areas, ranging from discrimination (e.g., Dar-maet (1974 , reported in Messick & Sentis, 1983 . Subley & Gross, 1983; Gaertner & Dovidio, 1977 ; Snyder jects who had completed a task allocated a $7.00 payKleck, Strenta & Mentzer, 1979) , to task decisions (e.g., ment between themselves and another subject; they Hsee, 1995) and interpersonal conflict (e.g., Messick & gave themselves more than half the amount, regardless Sentis, 1983; Thompson & Loewenstein, 1992) , to im-of whether they were led to believe that their task inpression management (e.g., Fandt & Ferris, 1990) and volved more work but took less time than the other self-evaluation (e.g., Dunning, Meyerowitz & Holzberg, subject's or to believe the reverse. This study convinc-1988) .
ingly demonstrated what Messick and Sentis (1983) refer to as the egocentric bias, but its support for the Below, I examine three studies which I find most relevant to the present research. One was on discrimi-elasticity hypothesis was rather indirect. It is not clear whether the quantity/time tradeoff-which can be renation (Snyder, et al., 1979) . Subjects entering a wait-garded as a form of elasticity-was necessary for the praise nor underappraise it in the control condition, the influence of the fiancé(e) factor would be negative observed bias. Theoretically it is possible that the subjects would have given themselves more money even if (i.e., pull the appraisal down) in the buyer condition, positive (i.e., push the appraisal up) in the seller condithere had not been such a tradeoff. In this paper, I report two studies that provided more direct tests of tion, and zero in the control condition. the elasticity hypothesis.
Method
Material and design. The questionnaire used in the study had six versions, each representing one of the 2 Subjects served as hypothetical real estate apprais-Elasticity 1 3 Fiancé(e) conditions. The buyer/inelastic ers and assessed one condominium relative to another and the buyer/elastic versions opened with the follow-(comparison) condominium. The two condos were de-ing instructions: scribed in terms of (a) specific features and (b) the role Your fiancé(e) is interested in buying a particular 2-bedroom of the appraiser's fiancé(e) in the situation. It was ascondo. You are a real estate appraiser. It so happens that the sumed that subjects would consider condo features as owner of that condo, who is unaware of your relationship with justifiable factors, and would consider the fiancé(e) facyour fiancé(e), hires you to appraise his unit. Your appraisal will determine for how much the owner is willing to sell the unit to tor as an unjustifiable factor. This assumption was veryour fiancé(e).
ified in a separate pretest.
2
The study employed a 2 Elasticity 1 3 Fiancé(e) fac-In each scenario the focal condo was compared with a torial design. Elasticity included two between-subject condo the appraiser had assessed at $100,000. In the conditions, inelastic and elastic. In the inelastic condi-inelastic condition the two condos were described idention, the focal condo was described as identical to the tical: comparison condo in all of the features; hence, there . . . the two units [are] identical even in the most subtle aspects: was no elasticity as to which condo was better. In the For example, the living rooms in both units include a separate elastic condition, the focal condo was described as bet- these features were uncertain, it was elastic as to whether and by how much the focal condo was better
In the elastic condition the focal condo was said to be or worse than the comparison condo overall.
better than the $100,000 condo in certain features and The Fiancé(e) variable involved three between-subworse in others: ject conditions: buyer, seller, and control. In the buyer condition, the appraiser's fiancé(e) was a prospective . . . the present unit has a larger living room but does not have a separate dining area, as the $100,000 unit does. The owner of buyer of the focal condo; in the seller condition, the the present unit recently replaced all the original appliances fiancé(e) was the seller of the focal condo; and in the with new ones. These new appliances are worth more than control condition, there was no mention of a fiancé(e). $9,000, but because the owner bought them from a store which Because it was in the fiancé(e)'s interest to underapwas going out of business, he paid only $3,000. The present unit praise the focal condo in the buyer condition, overaphas carpeted floor and the quality of the wood underneath the carpet is uncertain.
praise it in the seller condition, and neither overapThe questionnaires for the seller and for the control 2 As discussed earlier, a factor is considered unjustifiable if the conditions were identical to those for the seller condijudge wants to take it into consideration but knows that he or she tion except that in the seller condition the focal condo should not, that is, there is a discrepancy between what the judge was said to be what the appraiser's fiancé(e) was trying wants to do and what the judge thinks he/she should do. To verify to sell and in the control version nothing was menthat subjects indeed considered the fiancé(e) factor an unjustifiable tioned about a fiancé(e).
factor, 24 University of Chicago students read vignettes similar to the buyer/inelastic and the seller/inelastic versions of the questionIn each version, subjects were asked how much they naire and indicated what appraisals they wanted to give and what would tell the client the focal condo was worth. they thought they should give. In the ''buyer'' condition, the ''want'' appraisals were significantly lower than the ''should'' appraisals (Ms Subjects and procedure. Respondents were 185 un-Å $83K and $100K, respectively; t Å 4.25, p õ .001). In the ''seller'' dergraduate and graduate students solicited in dining condition, the ''want'' appraisals were significantly higher than the halls at the University of Chicago. Each participant ''should'' appraisals (Ms Å $114K and $100K, respectively; t Å 2.90, p received one of the six versions of the questionnaire õ .01). Thus, the fiancé(e) factor met the definition of an unjustifiable factor. and completed it individually. In exchange for their conditions. There was no significant overall effect for Elasticity (F õ 1); this result was expected, because only subjects' theories of what they would do or revealed what they would actually do. Second, subjects in the study may have thought that the appraisals would be checked by a third party, and it is not clear participation, respondents either received a candy bar or participated in a lottery drawing for $100.
whether the Fiancé(e) 1 Elasticity interaction occurred because subjects in the elastic condition engaged in a Prediction self-justification process and believed in the appraisals they made or because they thought they could use the If, as normative decision theories would suggest, unelasticity to dupe the third party and knowingly subjustifiable factors behave just like other justifiable facmitted biased appraisals. tors, then the fiancé(e) factor would have a constant effect on appraisals regardless of whether there was STUDY 2 elasticity in condo features or not; in other words, there would be no interaction between Fiancé(e) and Elasticity. Alternatively, if the elasticity hypothesis was true, Study 2 tested the elasticity hypothesis in a context then the fiancé(e) factor would have a greater effect in very different from that of Study 1. It involved a real the elastic condition than in the inelastic condition, judgment task and entailed real financial consebecause in the elastic condition subjects in the buyer quences. In addition, subjects were assured, both condition could emphasize the negative features of the through instructions and through the actual procecondo and those in the seller condition positive features dures of the study, that their judgments were confiof the condo. Thus, there would be a Fiancé(e) 1 Elas-dential and could not possibly be checked by a third ticity interaction effect.
party. Subjects took an ostensible language intuition test in Results and Discussion which they guessed the meanings of Chinese symbols. After the test subjects calculated and submitted their Table 1 summarizes the mean appraisals in Study scores. The scores determined the amount of money 1.
3 A 3 Fiancé(e) 1 2 Elasticity analysis of variance they could receive if they won a lottery. Every effort was performed. In support of the elasticity hypothesis, was made to ensure subjects that no one could possibly there was a significant Fiancé(e) 1 Elasticity interaccheck their scores against their tests. Two factors tion effect (F(2, 173) Å 6.71, p õ .01), indicating that
would have affected what scores subjects submitted: the fiancé(e) factor had a greater impact on appraisals their actual performance on the test and their desire when there was elasticity in condo features than when there was not. When the focal condo was identical to the comparison condo, the appraisals in the three Fi-to score high. It was assumed that subjects would con-questions were A's and asked to go back to the second page to check which questions they had answered corsider the former as a justifiable factor and the latter as an unjustifiable factor. This assumption was verified rectly. The next step was to calculate the score.
The scoring instructions had two versions, representin a separate pretest. 5 The study involved two Elasticity conditions: inelastic and elastic. In the inelastic con-ing the inelastic and the elastic conditions, respectively. In both versions, subjects were told that only dition, there was no elasticity in deciding which questions should count in their scoring and in the elastic 10 of the 20 questions would count. In the inelastic condition, the 10 questions were those which were oddcondition there was elasticity. It was predicted that subjects in the elastic condition would submit higher numbered. Subjects read: scores than those in the inelastic condition.
Your score for the test does not depend on all of the 20 questions. It depends only on the 10 odd-numbered questions (i.e., Nos. 1, Method 3, 5 . . .). Of those 10 questions, you get 10 points for every one you answered right. (There are no penalties for wrong answers.)
Material and design. The study utilized a booklet . . . that contained three pages. On the first page were genIn the elastic condition, the 10 questions that would eral instructions, on the second page the language test, count were those in which the Chinese symbols looked and on the third page scoring instructions. According most yang (as opposed to yin). Subjects were told that to the general instructions on the first (cover) page, some Chinese symbols looked yin and some looked subjects would first take the test and then calculate yang, that different people had different perceptions, their own scores. After that, they would write the score and that: on the cover page, detach it from the rest of the booklet, tests once the cover page was detached from the test.
Because it was not elastic as to which questions were Subjects were then told that, after the experiment, odd-numbered, but elastic as to which Chinese symbols one cover page (with the score on it) would be drawn looked most yang, it was not elastic as to which quesat random from the lottery box and that the winner tions should count in the inelastic condition, but elastic would be contacted and receive a cash prize. The as to which questions should count in the elastic condiamount of the prize would depend on the winner's tion. score: $0 if the score was 0, $10 if the score was 10, After scoring their tests and writing the score on the . . ., $100 if the score was 100.
cover page, subjects dropped the cover page into the Subjects were then directed to the second page to ''lottery'' box and the rest of the booklet into the ''comtake the language test. The test consisted of 20 quespleted tests'' box, as instructed. tions like the following:
Subjects and procedure. The experiment was con-1. means (A) green or (B) blue ducted in dining halls of the University of Chicago; 2. means (A) right or (B) left 82 students participated. Each participant randomly . . . received one of the two versions of the booklet and comTo answer a question, subjects would guess whether pleted it individually. After the experiment, a cover the Chinese symbol meant the concept labeled ''A'' or page was randomly drawn and the winner, whose test the one labeled ''B'' and circle their choice. score was 70, was contacted and received $70 cash. After they completed the test, subjects were directed As subjects were promised, the detached cover pages to the third page, containing the scoring instructions. indeed could not be matched up with the rest of the Subjects were told that the right answers for all of the booklets. However, there was a slight difference between the inelastic and the elastic conditions in the way a line was printed on the cover page; that enabled 5 To verify that the desire to score high was an unjustifiable factor, me to separate responses in one condition from those 18 University of Chicago students read a scenario similar to the inelastic condition of the present study and indicated the score they in the other.
wanted to submit and that they thought they should submit. Responses to the ''want'' question were significantly higher than those Prediction to the ''should'' question (M Å 6.94 and 5.28, respectively, t Å 3.04,
Had subjects in the elastic condition assessed the p õ .01), indicating the desire to score high met the definition of an unjustifiable factor.
yin/yang nature of the Chinese symbols without biases, their scores would be about the same as those of sub-both through the instructions and through the procedure of the study that no one could possibly check how jects in the inelastic condition. The reason is simple: Which questions one answered correctly should have they scored their tests. Had the subjects simply wanted to misreport their scores, they could have done so even nothing to do with which questions contained yanglooking symbols, just as which questions one answered in the inelastic condition, and there should have been no significant differences between the elastic and the correctly should have nothing to do with which questions were odd-numbered. In contrast, according to the inelastic conditions. elasticity hypothesis, subjects in the elastic condition
GENERAL DISCUSSION
would perceive the yin/yang natures of the symbols in a direction favoring their desire to score high on the When making judgments, we are often confronted test, namely, perceive the symbols in the correctly annot only with factors that we believe that we should swered questions as more yang than those in the incortake into consideration but also with factors that we rectly answered questions. Consequently, subjects in wish to take into consideration but know we should the elastic condition would count more correctly annot. According to the elasticity hypothesis proposed in swered questions than incorrectly answered questions this article, the influence of the unjustifiable factor deand thereby give themselves a higher score than those pends on whether there is elasticity in justifiable facin the inelastic condition.
tors: One's judgment will veer more in the direction of the unjustifiable factor if there is elasticity in the Results and Discussion justifiable factors than if there is not. The studies reported in this article secured support for this hypotheThe result confirmed the elasticity hypothesis: Subjects in the inelastic condition submitted a mean score sis and suggested that the elasticity effect occurs probably because the elasticity enables one to justify an othof 58.75 and those in the elastic condition a mean score of 69.05, and the difference was significant (t Å 2.35, erwise unjustifiable judgment to oneself, and not just because the elasticity enables one to dupe a third party.
Another way to analyze the results was to compare Several comments about the studies are in order here. First, as in Study 1, the elasticity manipulated in subjects' reported scores with their actual answers. Based on their responses in the detached booklets, sub-Study 2 was also rooted in the weights of the justifiable factors. Note that subjects' responses to the 20 quesjects in the inelastic condition on average answered 5.829 of the 10 odd-numbered correctly; thus, their tions can be viewed as 20 separate factors and determining which questions counted can be viewed as mean score should have been 10 1 5.829, or 58.29. The scores actually reported by subjects in the inelastic determining whether to assign a weight of 1 or a weight of 0 to each factor. In the inelastic condition, there was condition (M Å 58.75) were extremely close to that mean score. In the elastic condition, subjects on aver-no elasticity in determining which response deserved what weight and therefore no elasticity in the aggreage answered 11.21 of the 20 questions correctly, and if they had assessed the yin/yang natures of the Chinese gate value of those responses. In the elastic condition, there was elasticity in determining which response desymbols without biases, they should have excluded half of those questions and the resulting score should have served what weight and hence elasticity in the aggregate value of those responses. been half of 10 1 11.21, i.e., 56.05. However, the scores actually reported by subjects in the elastic condition Second, for ease of exposition, the present research has treated factors as if they were either purely justifi-(M Å 69.05) were significantly higher (t Å 4.53, p õ .001 using a one-group t-test). These results indicate able or purely unjustifiable. Actually, whether a factor is justifiable or unjustifiable is relative and contextthat in the inelastic condition the desire to score high had virtually no influence on scoring, but in the elastic specific. Suppose, for example, that someone wants to buy a used car and has seen two options: an attractivecondition it had a significant effect.
I would suggest that the observed elasticity effect looking sports car that is not very reliable and a mundane-looking station wagon that is reliable. Here, the was more likely a result of self-justification than a result of justification to others. In other words, the reason buyer may either perceive the style of a car as a justifiable factor or as an unjustifiable factor. If the buyer's subjects in the elastic condition submitted higher scores was that those subjects, by distorting their eval-purpose of having the car is to show off and impress others, then she will most likely consider style as a uation of yin/yang, convinced themselves that they deserved those scores, not that they thought they could justifiable factor. If the buyer has limited means and needs the car only for basic transportation, she will dupe other people and knowingly misreported their scores. As discussed earlier, it was conveyed to subjects more likely perceive it as an unjustifiable factor.
Finally, one may argue that even in Study 2 subjects superego. According to the generalized elasticity hypothesis, as long as there is a conflict between the might still suspect that some third party could check ''should'' and the ''want,'' elasticity in the situation will on what they did and therefore the observed elasticity shift one's final decision toward the ''want'' side. effect was a result of whether one could justify one's decision to others and not a result of whether one could justify one's decision to oneself. This, I think, is a quite open to multiple interpretations. Just as the influence Hastorf, A. H., & Cantril, H. (1954) . They saw a game: A case study. of an unjustifiable factor is greater in the elastic condiJournal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 49, [129] [130] [131] [132] [133] [134] tion than in the inelastic condition, so will the influence Hsee, C. K. (1995) . Elastic justification in decision-making: How task of an unjustifiable factor be greater in reality than in irrelevant but tempting considerations influence decisions. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 62, [330] [331] [332] [333] [334] [335] [336] [337] a simplified or decomposed situation. Klein, W. M., & Kunda, Z. (1992) . Motivated person perception: ConAnother implication of the present research is that structing justifications for desired beliefs. Journal of Experimental it suggests the potential for a more general model of Social Psychology, 28, how elasticity influences judgments and decisions. Al- Kunda, Z. (1990) . The case for motivated reasoning. Psychological though the elasticity hypothesis discussed in this arti- Bulletin, 108, [480] [481] [482] [483] [484] [485] [486] [487] [488] [489] [490] [491] [492] [493] [494] [495] [496] [497] [498] cle focused only on judgment tasks that involve an un- Kunda, Z. (1987) . Motivated inference: Self-serving generation and justifiable factor, it may be generalized to any decision ''wants'' to do and what one believes one ''should'' do. Loewenstein, G. (1995) . Out of control: Visceral influences on behavior. Working paper, Carnegie Mellon Univ.
Such ''should-want'' conflicts may occur not only in Lord, C., Ross, L., & Lepper, M. R. (1979) . Biased assimilation and situations involving a self-serving motivation or involv- Pyszczynski, T., & Greenberg, J. (1987) . Toward an integration of
